Obama's support of nuclear security agency fell short of campaign promise

As a candidate, Barack Obama promised to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Association by outlining some lofty goals. The IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Obama's specific promise included provisions to:
 

• Double the IAEA budget by increasing the U.S. share in it
• Press other countries to approve the "Additional Protocol" which grants the IAEA permission to inspect nuclear facilities
• Establish IAEA verification procedures that go beyond the Additional Protocol so clandestine facilities can be better detected
• Create global nuclear security standards

The first part of Obama's promise to improve the association concerned funding. Obama promised that he would "work to double the IAEA funding" by increasing the U.S. annual share to about $225 million.

The United States voluntary contribution totaled $85.9 million last year and Obama's proposed budget for 2013 goes further, asking for $90 million.

The budget also requests another $111 million for the U.S. assessed contribution which is an increase over last year's $107 million.

But that's far short of his goal of $200 million per year.

Still, the initial promise wasn't just about the budget. Obama also promised to convince other countries to adopt the Additional Protocol. States that voluntarily sign the protocol grant the IAEA permission to inspect facilities and to conduct more stringent inspections.

In the past four years, 29 more countries have signed and adopted the Additional Protocol.

Another piece of this promise stated that the administration would work to gain agreement on effective global standards for nuclear safety and security.

We found that a Work Plan emerged from the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which was hosted by the U.S.

The work plan outlines standards for "storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such material for malicious purposes."

However, the plan operates on a voluntary basis, meaning that none of the participating countries are actually obligated to follow through with it.  

Obama also promised to pressure the 46 members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to prevent the transfer of technology to countries who haven't adopted the Additional Protocol.

In June 2011, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group changed their guidelines so that members could only export sensitive enrichment and reprocessing items to states that have adopted the Additional Protocol.

Obama's original goal referenced nuclear technology as a whole, and this requirement only restricts transport of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies, not all nuclear technology.

In response to complaints from countries like Brazil, the guideline was then amended so that states with additional safeguard systems in place could still receive technology.

The last part of the promise called for establishing stronger verification procedures that go beyond the Additional Protocol to better detect clandestine facilities. We found no evidence this ever happened.

Despite the increase in U.S. funding of the IAEA and the adoption of the Additional Protocol by more states, Obama fell short of the ambitious goals outlined in his original promise. We'll revisit this if we find new information, but for now we rate this a Promise Broken.